"Plato loves Socrates" says that Plato loves Socrates

To analyse those forms of propositions in psychology such as 'A believes that p is the case' and 'A has the thought p', Wittgenstein says at 5.542 of Tractatus that:

It is clear, however, that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought p', and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p': and this does not involve a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their objects.

Wittgenstein points exactly against the superficial thought of such forms of propositions - it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an object A (5.541).

First of all, how to understand / explain '"p" says p'? Let us consider a proposition of the form '"q" says p':

"Wittgenstein was taller than Russell" says that Socrates was fatter than Plato.

Everyone, as long as he / she understands this English sentence, can tell immediately without any thoughtful logical analysis that it is a false statement. Furthermore, he / she can also tell immediately that the following proposition is true (no matter whether it is the case that Wittgenstein was really taller than Russell):

"Wittgenstein was taller than Russell" says that Russell was shorter than Wittgenstein.

As Wittgenstein says at 3.14, propositional sign (such as "q") is a fact. Logically, to justify if such propositions of the form '"q" says p' is true, we can examine whether it is the case that q if and only if p, which is just a truth-operation of the p and q as Wittgenstein asserts at 5.54. Besides, to perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are related to one another in such and such a way (5.5423). Of course not all propositions of the form '"q" says p' can be understood in this way. Clearly, the following statement is not true:

"If it is raining, then it is raining" says that if it is hot, then it is hot.

Although it is of the form '"q" says p', where q if and only if p, both p and q are in fact tautologies. As Wittgenstein says at 4.461, tautologies say nothing. In the first place, "q" says nothing, so that we cannot even assert the following:

"If it is raining, then it is raining" says that if it is raining, then it is raining.

We cannot assert the following statement either:

"Wattginstein was taller than Sucrotis" says that Sucrotis was shorter than Wattginstein.

As long as the symbols "Wattginstein" and "Sucrotis" do not signify anything, "Wattginstein was taller than Sucrotis" is nonsensical. We cannot compare nonsensical propositions in the first place.

Then how to understand / explain / justify 'A says p'? We have to examine what A said on the objects of the fact p (if A has said something about them) to determine the correlation of this fact (what A said) and the fact p, as Wittgenstein asserts at 5.542. Logically, "p" should say something in the first place, and we compare the fact p with each of the facts represented by the finite set of sensical statements of A. A composite soul would no longer be a soul (5.5421). What about if A says nonsense? We can just tell that A says nonsense, but we cannot have a statement like:

A says that Sucrotis Wattginstein was tham shorter.

It is nothing but just another piece of nonsense! Hence, Wittgenstein says at 5.5422 that

The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 'A makes the judgement p', must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense.

Thus, if I tell you, "I make the judgement that Sucrotis was shorter than Wattginstein," and if I do not tell you a piece of nonsense, it means that I really know two guys called Sucrotis and Wattginstein, and maybe Sucrotis was in fact taller than Wattginstein so that my judgement may be wrong, but at least my judgement is not a piece of nonsense. Besides, propositions occur in such propositions still as bases of truth-operations as Wittgenstein asserts at 5.54.

Nevertheless, Russell says in his introduction to Tractatus that

This problem is simply one of a relation of two facts, namely, the relation between the series of words used by the believer and the fact which makes these words true or false.

But on the other hand, he concludes that the proposition does not occur at all in the same sense in which it occurs in a truth-function. I think that is why Wittgenstein believed that Russell did not really understand the Tractatus.

Anyway, is the heading "proposition" a good example? Is "Plato loves Socrates" really a sensical proposition (it is an example in Russell's introduction to Tractatus)? Is "love" what we cannot speak about? Must we pass "love" over in silence (as the conclusion at the end of Tractatus)? Er... I have such a thought, but my wife doesn't think so!